The Battle of the Menin Road Ridge

20th - 26th September 1917.

The battle simply called "Passchendaele" is officially called "The Third Battle of Ypres" which raged from 31st July until 10th November 1917. It consisted of many bitter battles, among them:- Pilkem Ridge 31 July-2 August, Langemarck 16-18 August, Menin Road Ridge 20th-26th September, Polygon Wood 26 September-3 October, Broodseinde 4th October, Poelcapelle 9th October, 1st Passchendaele 12 October, 2nd Passchendaele 26 October-10 November. The 1st Middlesex were in the third of these.

The third battle began on 20th September, the front selected extending from the Ypres-Comines Canal, north of Hollebeke, to the Ypres-Staden railway north of Langemarck. The average depth of the objectives was 1000 yards, but in the neighbourhood of the Menin Road the ground to be won was about a mile in depth.

Before Zero hour on 20th, however, certain rearrangements in the British front had taken place, which included a modification of artillery tactics to meet the situation created by the change in the enemy's methods of defence. The new system adopted by the enemy (which, it must be admitted, had met with a certain amount of success in the previous battles) consisted in manning his forward trenches with just sufficient troops to disorganise an attack, the bulk of his forces lying in close reserve ready to deliver a powerful and immediate blow which might recover his lost positions before the British had time to consolidate their gains. Sir Douglas Haig's method of dealing with the new German system of defence was to limit the depth of objectives and reorganise the artillery so as to deal effectively with hostile concentrations and counter-attacks.

The wretched state of the weather since the battle of 26th - 18th August made a long wait necessary in order to give the ground time to dry after the heavy rains. The weather improved at the beginning of September, and artillery and other preparations proceeded steadily. Nevertheless, it was the third week in the month before the next attack was possible.

The left flank of the Second Army was extended northwards, the objectives in front of it now including the high ground crossed by the Menin Road. This change necessitated a similar change in the dispositions of some of the divisions under Sir Herbert Plumer (the Army Commander), amongst which was the 41st Division, containing the 19th and 23rd Middlesex. Of the 12 divisions in the front line of battle on the morning of 20th September only one (the 41st) contained Middlesex men. There were two divisions of the Second Army in reserve-the 33rd and 37th-and one of the Fifth Army-the 29th-which also contained battalions of the Regiment, i.e., the 1st and 18th (33rd Division), 4th (37th Division), and 16th (29th Division).

The chief interest in the battle, from a regimental point of view, is, however, centred in the 23rd and 1st Battalions, the former (of the 123rd Brigade, 41st Division) attacking the enemy at 6.30 p.m. on 20th, and the latter putting up a truly magnificent fight when the enemy counter-attacked on 25th September.

By nightfall of 20th September, the whole British line from the Ypres-Comines Canal to the Ypres-Staden railway had been advanced, the greatest depth of ground won being astride the Menin Road and including the whole of the high ground covered by the road, and for which much heavy fighting had taken place during the previous attack. But the enemy did not abandon their important positions without desperate efforts to regain them. The afternoon and evening of 20th saw no less than eleven heavy counter-attacks against various parts of the line; all were broken up and the enemy repulsed. From the 21st September onwards until and including the 25th September very heavy counter-attacks were launched by the Germans on wide fronts between Tower Hamlets and the Polygon Wood, and north-east of St. Julien. “All these attacks,” record the official despatches, “were repulsed except that, on the 25th September, parties of German infantry succeeded in entering our lines north of the Menin Road. Heavy and confused fighting took place in this area throughout the day, in which English, Scottish and Australian troops (33rd Division and 5th Australian Division) gradually drove the enemy from the limited foothold he had gained.”

23rd September 1917

In this fighting the 1st Middlesex, of the 33rd Division, gained fresh honours for the Regiment. The Battalion had received orders on 22nd to proceed up the line on 23rd and immediately made preparations for the move. Just after 11a.m. on the latter date the Middlesex men left camp and, marching via Rosenhill, Dickebusch, Kruisstraathoek and Trois Rois, reached dug-outs in the railway embankment and the banks of the Zillebeke Lake, the Battalion being settled in by 4.30 p.m. At 10 a.m. on the morning of 24th Major H. A. Hanley, temporarily in command of the Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel Elgee,* the C.O., being then at Berthen in command of the 98th Brigade Depot Battalion),** accompanied by one officer and one N.C.O. from each company, went up to reconnoitre the line which the Battalion was to take over that evening from a battalion of the York and Lancs Regiment, prior to an attack to be launched (in conjunction with a general attack) on the morning of 26th.
* ( Lieut.-Colonel J. W. L. Elgee had recently returned to the Battalion. He had been evacuated sick to England in March. Lieut.-Colonel Hanley tells this fine story of Lieut.-Colonel Elgee: On rejoining the Battalion (about 20th September), he learned that we were going into the next show at Ypres. He at once said that, as I had had the Battalion for the last six months or so, and had had all the trouble of training it, etc., I should have the honour of commanding it in the battle affair, but that he would go in with us and serve under me. He even suggested this to the Division, who decided, however, that it would not be practicable, but that Elgee should stand down and let me take the Battalion in. This, just to show the fine soldierly spirit of Elgee !)
** (The Depot Battalion was formed of a percentage of officers, N.C.Os. and men from each battalion of the Brigade when the latter was engaged in battle operations.)

This line lay between the Polygon Wood (just east of Black Watch Corner) and the Reutelbeek. It had been but a day or two in our possession and was still in the course of consolidation. The defences consisted of shell-hole posts connected by short lengths of trench; all around were huge craters. Just behind the centre of the line was Carlisle Farm. The German defences were stronger than our own; they had a fairly continuous line of trenches in front (west) of Cameron House and Jut Farm, with numerous shell-hole defences, and here and there several ruined buildings, which served as machine-gun posts. About midway between the opposing lines of trenches, and in front of the northern sub-sector of the Brigade line, was another farm ( Jerk House), also in possession of the enemy. It was this line (570 yards in length), hardly consolidated, and so difficult to distinguish in places, that men going to and from the line frequently lost their way amidst the maze of craters and shell holes, subjected all the while in a more or less severe degree to heavy shell fire, that the Middlesex were to take over before the next battle. The records describe it briefly as consisting "mainly of short, isolated lengths of trench dug amongst the shell holes, with supporting lines in rear."

Major Hanley and his officers returned from their reconnaissance, and at 6.30 that night the 1st Middlesex left the railway dug-outs, south-west of Zillebeke Lake, and, proceeding by sections at 100 yards intervals, moved up via Dormy House and Yeomanry Track to the front line. Guides met the various platoons at the starting point, and the relief was carried through to the accompaniment of a good deal of shell fire. One shell fell amidst a platoon of "B" Company, killing one man and wounding the platoon commander-2/Lieut. Buttle-and 10 other ranks.

25th September 1917

Battalion Headquarters had moved up to the southern edge of Glencorse Wood, where news of the relief was anxiously awaited. But reports were slow in coming in, many of the guides losing their way in the crater area, whilst the enemy's shell fire was increasing in intensity. "D" Company was the first to report "relief complete," but it was 11.40 p.m. before that news reached Battalion Headquarters. For some hours no further news was received, all telephone wires having been cut by hostile shell fire. "A" Company, which was in position before 10 p.m., was the last to report. The Company Commander had sent several orderlies with reports (other communication being impossible), and hours passed before at last one got through. Eventually, by means of officer patrols, all companies were, at 4.30 a.m. on 25th, accounted for as being in position-"A" Company on the right, "B" on the left, "D" supporting "A," and "C" supporting "B."

Once in position, the two forward companies sent out patrols and covered their fronts with a series of posts. The right sub-sector of the 33rd Divisional front was held by the 100th Infantry Brigade, whose line extended from the southern bank of the Reutelbeek southwards to the Ypres.-.Menin Road. The 5th Australian Division was on the left of the 98th Brigade

At about 5.30 a.m. the enemy suddenly placed a very violent barrage on the front, support and reserve lines of the 33rd and Australian Divisions. Some indication of the intensity of this barrage may be gathered from the fact that the Germans employed no less than 27 batteries of field artillery, 17 field howitzer batteries, 15 heavy howitzer batteries, and 5 batteries of H.V. longrange guns; indeed, an officer of the Middlesex stated that it was "one of the heaviest bombardments of the War." Gas and heavy shrapnel were largely used. There was a thick morning mist when the bombardment opened, under cover of which and the fire of their guns, the enemy attacked the Australians‘right, the 1st Middlesex and the 100th Brigade south-west of Reutelbeek.

From captured documents it is possible to give quotations from the orders issued to the two German battalions-3rd Battalion, 229th R.I.R., and 2nd Battalion, 230th R.I.R.-which attacked the 33rd Divisional front. These orders were issued on 24th September and, after detailing the two battalions (already mentioned) as the assaulting troops, states that they "will attack the enemy opposite them to-morrow (September 25th, 1917) and will eject him from his present position." The sector of attack is given next: the 3rd Battalion, 229th R.I.R., from the southern edge of Polygon Wood to the Reutelbach (Reutelbeek), i.e., Veldhoek Trench (called by the Germans the Wilhem Stellung), Carlisle Farm, and the 3rd Battalion, 230th R.I.R., from the stream southwards. Light machine guns were to be in the front line, heavy machine guns were to accompany the first, second and third waves of the attack, one platoon of heavy machine gunners to be attached to each company.

The Assault Battalion (a special formation then in vogue in the German Armies) of the Fourth German Army was to take a prominent part in the attack.

As soon as the barrage opened (referred to as the "destructive fire") the Germans were to "work closer to the enemy ".."touch must be kept." Other instructions were: "The companies will attack with strong first waves immediately the barrage lifts in order not to give the enemy any time to collect his wits." Finally, "troops must be in position by 4.40a.m. Destructive fire (barrage) starts at 5.15a.m. Fall in for the attack 5.45am"

It will therefore be gathered from the above German orders that, ere ever they had time to acquaint themselves with the nature of the ground in front of them or their surroundings, the 1st Middlesex would be heavily attacked.

The story of this attack and the way it was met is one of the proudest memories of all Die-Hards.

Curtained by the thick mist and under cover of the merciless barrage his guns were putting down on the front, support and reserve lines of his opponents, the enemy advanced at about 6 a.m. His troops, in considerable strength, swarmed across No Man's Land. The brunt of the first attack seems to have fallen on three platoons in the centre and on the right of "B" Company. Handicapped by the fact that they had never seen their front in daylight, and that the Yorks and Lancs, whom they had relieved, had been unable to give them very much information (that unit only having held the sector for about 24 hours), these platoons nevertheless held their ground for some time. But, aided by their knowledge of the ground and (to them) the friendly mist, the German troops worked their way through and between the posts and took them in rear. "These three platoons," states the narrative, "seem to have made a good fight, one post being seen entirely surrounded, but offering a fierce resistance."

On the right, "A" Company (and the 100th Brigade on their flank) was attacked from behind a small ridge in front. But with Lewis-gun and rifle fire the enemy was completely repulsed, and as his troops fell back they were subjected to a severe flanking fire. Here at least he made no progress.

About 6.30 a.m. the enemy launched another attack. Five waves of Germans with supports came on unhindered by a practice barrage which had been placed along the whole German front that morning by order of Second Army Headquarters. Lieut.-Colonel Hanley states: "When the heavy "gunning" started out over the front line it was thought to be merely our own side having their "furious joy," and no notice was taken. Owing to the thick mist, nothing could be seen of any attack."

The attack came from the direction of Jerk House. The first attack had cut a gap between "A" and "B" Companies, and through this gap the Germans, gradually closing in, worked from shell hole to shell hole. Desperate fighting, much of a hand-to-hand nature, now took place. "A" Company was losing heavily, and eventually the enemy entered Veldhoek Trench from the left, bombing along it in a southerly direction. Finally, the remnants of the Company fell back about 150 yards. In the fighting the Company Commander-Captain S. Preston-was killed, also 2/Lieut. T. J. Young, of "B" Company, who had been acting as liaison officer between the two Companies. All the officers of these two front Companies were either killed or missing.

Remnants of both "A" and "B" Companies were by now making their way back to the support line, where "C" and "D" Companies, unable to see owing to the thick mist and kept down in their trenches by the two heavy barrages and hostile machine-gun barrage, were in ignorance of what had been happening in the front line. But as soon as they learned the situation steps were taken to check the enemy's advance. Lewis guns were pushed out to cover the gap in the centre, and groups of men dashed forward into shell holes. On came the enemy, but now he met comparatively fresh troops and at once sustained a check.

"D" the right support Company, endeavoured to get into touch with the left of the 100th Brigade, but owing to the marshy ground failed to do so. The mist lifted and troops of the 100th Brigade were seen falling back, thus uncovering the flank of the Middlesex. In the distance the enemy in large numbers was observed crossing the ridge in front, and heavy fire was brought to bear on him. Once again the grey waves were checked. But all the while enemy aeroplanes, flying low down over the Middlesex trenches, harassed the Die-Hards with machine-gun fire.

Battalion Headquarters had by now received news that the enemy had penetrated the front line, and Major Hanley prepared his position for defence should the Germans break through the supporting companies. The situation was reported to 98th Brigade Headquarters, and the latter ordered the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to place one company at the disposal of the O.C., 1st Middlesex. At about 8 a.m. this Company ("C") was in a trench behind Battalion Headquarters of the Middlesex. But presently a platoon from the Highlanders was sent to fill a gap between the right of the Australians and the left of "C" Company (the left front company) of the Middlesex.

It was about this time that a corporal staggered into Battalion Headquarters and reported that No. 6 Platoon of "B" Company, under Sergeant Martin, was still holding on to its original position, in touch with the Australians on their left. These gallant fellows were on the extreme left of the Middlesex front line and, although exposed to frontal fire and enfiladed from their right, had refused to surrender and were clinging grimly, with extraordinary tenacity and courage, to their position. As soon as this information reached the C.O. he sent a message to Brigade Headquarters asking for the barrage to be put down on that flank.

Arrangements were being made to fill the gap between "D" and "C" Companies when orders arrived at Battalion Headquarters from Brigade Headquarters with details of an attack to be made in order to regain the original front line. The time was then about 12.30 p.m.

At 1.15 p.m. Battalion Orders for the attack were issued. The first paragraph reads: "The enemy has gained possession of our front line running J.15.d.4.8 to J.9.d.4.0, with the exception of one platoon on the extreme north of the sector, which still holds its position." The attack was to be made by the 1st Middlesex and "A" and "C" Companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, to regain the lost line. "C" Company of the Middlesex was to attack on the left on a front of 180 yards, "A" Company of the Highlanders in the centre on a frontage of 200 yards, and "B" Company on the right also on a front of 180 yards. Three platoons of "C" Company of the Highlanders were to support the attack and dig in 200 yards in rear when the original front line had been reorganised. Zero hour was to be 2 p.m.

The situation of the 1st Middlesex when these orders were issued was that "D" Company (right), with remnants of "A" and "B" Companies, and "C" (left), were holding a support line roughly about 200 yards behind the original front line. There was a gap between these two Companies very thinly held by one or two posts some 50 to 80 yards apart. Orders to the A. and S. Highlanders stated that their "A" Company was to advance on a front of 180 yards and endeavour to fill the gap, and when level with the Middlesex both Battalions were to advance to the original front line and consolidate it, afterwards pushing out posts to their front.

The barrage started well in front of the line held by "D" and "C" Companies of the Middlesex, the Highlanders having, therefore, to start without its assistance. "A" Company of the latter Battalion left the "jumping-off " line at 1.55, followed at 200 yards distance by "C" Company. The whole movement was, however, visible to the enemy, who put down a heavy barrage in front of the attack. In spite of the barrage the Highlanders pushed on and came up level with the Middlesex. But now a hurricane of machine-gun bullets swept the whole line and neither the Middlesex nor the Highlanders could move. They therefore consolidated the ground held, forming once more a continuous line across the Brigade front. A message, despatched to Battalion Headquarters, asking for a further barrage, did not reach its destination. In the meantime, consolidation proceeded.

Towards evening the Germans again advanced and heavy fire was opened upon them. The enemy, however, occupied some concrete emplacements on the right centre of the line and put up Red Cross flags. As they were observed strengthening their position no notice was taken of the flags, and both Middlesex and Highlanders kept the enemy under heavy fire.

26th September 1917

The situation remained the same until the third phase of the attack took place at dawn on 26th, when other units of the Brigade, passing through the now worn-out Die-Hards, not only gained the original line, but a line running north and south from Jut Farm to Cameron House. The Middlesex and Highlanders were then withdrawn during the afternoon of that date,* when it was definitely established that a new line had been gained and consolidated. Then, also, the gallant fellows-the survivors of No. 6 Platoon, "B" Company-who all alone had held out on the extreme left flank of the original line, were relieved. How many they numbered, how many were killed and wounded, it is not possible to say, but their fine devotion to duty was typical of the splendid spirit of the Regiment. *There is a mistake in the official despatches concerning the action of the Middlesex and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. In describing the Battle of Polygon Wood, 26th September-3rd October, the despatches state that the advancing troops "effected the relief of two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who, with great courage and resolution, had held out in our forward line all night, although isolated from the rest of our troops." From the foregoing account it will be seen that it was No. 6 Platoon of "B" Company of the 1st Middlesex who was isolated and held out.

On vacating the position they had held with so much staunchness, the 1st Middlesex made their way back to Clapham Junction (along the Menin Road), where for a little while they took shelter in some reserve trenches. They then marched back to the Railway Dug-outs south and south-west of Zillebeke Lake.

The losses of the 1st Battalion from 24th to 26th September, inclusive, were heavy: 4 officers were killed* 3 wounded and 2 missing; in other ranks the losses were 37 killed, 69 wounded, 131 missing, and 12 missing believed prisoners-in all a total of 9 officers and 249 other ranks. * In addition to the two officers already given, Lieut. E. N. Whyte and 2/Lieut. W. G. Rapley were amongst the killed-all on 25th September.

(IV) THE BATTLE OF POLYGON WOOD:

26th September-3rd October.

The heavy fighting which had taken place after the successful advance on 23rd September was not allowed to interfere with the plans made for an attack by the Second and Fifth Armies (on 26th September) from south of Tower Hamlets to north-east of St. Julien-a front of just under 6 miles. South of the Menin Road only a short advance was intended, and north of the road the objective was a position from which a direct assault could be made upon that portion of the main ridge between Noordemhoek and Broodseinde, traversed by the Becelaere-Passchendaele Road.

The battle began at 5.50 a.m. and, as already described, the attacking units of the 33rd Division passed through the line of the 1st Middlesex, relieving a platoon of "B" Company, who, with great courage and resolution, had held out, though isolated from the remainder of the line. The 1st Battalion was, however, not engaged in the battle and had indeed seen its last action in the Battles of Ypres, 1917.

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