The Battle of the Aisne. 27th May 1918.

Text taken from the War Diary of 2^nd Battalion, Middlesex Regiment.
See also The German Offensives of 1918 in Champagne

The War Diary refers to a map but it appears to be missing. This map, supplied courtesy of www.ancestralresearch.org.uk shows the dispositions of 2/Middlesex at 1:00 AM on 27th May 1918. Click for a larger version.

At 1 a.m. on the 27th May, as predicted by the German prisoners, in the darkness of a moonless night, the German bombardment opened. The French and British batteries at once began counter preparation. But those north of the Aisne, overwhelmed by the violence of the enemy fire, by which many guns were destroyed and a large proportion of the detachments put out of action by gas although they struggled on gallantly, rapidly grew less and less effective in their reply.

The enemy fire covered 24 miles of the Allied front, from Berry au Bac to Chavignon (11 miles north east of Soissons) ^Note1 held by the British 8th and 50th Divisions, and the French 22^nd and 21st Divisions. But, for the purpose of deception, the bombardment was extended on the right and left by the enemy corps on either side which were not taking part in the assault, so that it appeared to the Allies to include a frontage of about thirty-six miles from Brimont near Reims to Leuilly, due north of Soissons. The last-named town was itself bombarded, and the fire reached back to the line of the Vesle, nearly twelve miles behind the front. Every battery position, village, farm and railway station, every bridge and road-junction was systematically shelled. On the right, in the British area north of the Aisne, as far as Craonne, the bombardment of the defences extended to a depth of over three thousand yards, covering both the Forward and Battle Zones; on the Chemin des Dames ridge it was shallower, from 1,600 to 2,200 yards, but it covered, at one time or another - the swept zone being divided into four belts shelled at different times - all the top of the ridge and the forward slopes and part of the reverse slopes. This concentration of fire was the master- piece of the same artillery expert, Colonel Bruchmüller, who had prepared the artillery attack against the Fifth Army on the 21st March, and against the Arras front on the 28th March. He had had five weeks in which to organize it. By some who had experienced the previous enemy bombardments of the year 1918, that of the 27th May was considered to be far the heaviest, as indeed it was. On the 21st March there had been 1,706 German batteries on a 64-mile frontage, which gives 26.6 per mile; on the 27th May, 855 batteries were directed on a 24-mile frontage, that is 35.6 per mile, but no less than 466 batteries were concentrated on the 111mile frontage of the British 50th and French 22nd Divisions in the centre, that is between 40 and 41 batteries per mile ^{Note 2}

The following is a German description of the bombardment: (Monograph, p.27)

Contrary to previous procedure, in which the fire-preparation of an attack had begun with the comprehensive engagement of the enemy's artillery, this time, from 1 a.m. for the first ten minutes, all guns and trench-mortars simultaneously threw them- selves at the highest rate of fire, using gas ammunition, on all targets within reach, in order to create at the very start irremediable confusion and moral effect among the enemy. [At any rate, it forced everyone, right back to divisional head- quarters to put on gas masks, a serious handicap in the dark .] After this, the mass of the batteries turned their fire for 65 minutes [1.10 to 2.15 a.m.], with mixed gas and high explosive, on the Allied artillery, whilst the trench-mortars set about the systematic destruction of the front defences and their wire.

During this period all artillery opposition was to be smothered and the infantry in the forward positions so held down that the outposts of the position divisions could occupy a line beyond the Ailette and enable the engineers to prepare the pas- sages and the assault infantry to advance up to and over the Ailette bottom without hindrance. Simultaneously, all important traffic and communication centres, such as bridges, railway establishments, approach roads, head- quarters, telephone exchanges and camps were to be kept under fire so as to prevent the  arrival of reserves and reinforcements.

The next 85 minutes [2.15 to 3.40 a. m.] were to be devoted, by groups specially detailed, to steady, systematic counter-battery work, using principally gas shell and shooting by the map, so as to crush the Allied artillery. All the long-range gun batteries were to fire continuously on distant targets up to the line Jondhery, Fismes, Braine, Soissons, that is the line of the Vesle and thence the Aisne to Soissons.

The rest of the artillery used this fire period, in co-operation with the trench mortars, for the thorough destruction of all infantry positions, creeping backwards and forwards several times on the various sectors. At 3.35 a.m. all batteries detailed to form the creeping barrage put their fire down on the Allied front trenches .

The continued effect of the guns, trench mortars and gas had been indeed over-whelming: all headquarters had been under fire, gas masks had to be worn as far back as divisional headquarters, and most communications had been cut. The Front Zone had been nearly everywhere rendered untenable, the strongpoints obliterated, casualties in the infantry had been very heavy, most of the machine guns and artillery were out of action. For the second time in the 'War, the first being at Messines in June 1917, what had been so often attempted had been accomplished: the artillery bombardment had been so severe that all resistance had been crushed and the infantry had only to advance to take possession of the front position.

At 3.40 a.m., nearly twenty minutes before it began to get light, the barrage moved on, and the German infantry, who had pushed up as near as they could, rose for the assault. By this time a thick mist had arisen on the greater part of the front, made thicker by smoke shells and gas, which prevented the enemy being seen until he was close up to the Allied trenches.

For the first time the front part of the German barrage was gas, followed by high explosive, which not only compelled the Allied troops to keep on their gas masks, but contributed an additional element of surprise. ^{Note 3}

The heaviest weight of the infantry, as it had been with the artillery, fell on the centre. ^{Note 4} Opposite the British 21st Division were two German divisions and a third in second line; against the 8th Division, two; against the 50th Divisions, three, with another in second line; against the French 22nd Division, five, with two more in second line; against the French 21st Division, three, with one in second line; and against the French 61st Division, three, with one in second line. This made a total of 18 in the first line and 6 in second line, without counting the Seventh Army Reserves, instead of the five shown on the French situation map of the 26th May, against 6 Allied divisions LI front line and 4 in reserve - nearly two and a half to one; but on the 24 miles selected for the break-through, there were 13 in the front line against 4, that is 34 to 1; and in the centre, against the 50th Division and the French 22nd Division, 8 against 2, that is 4 to 1.

It was on the front of the French 22nd Division, on the Chemin des Dames, on the British left, a division which had been engaged alongside the British in the Larch battle, that the main force of the enemy's onslaught fell. Besides the original "battering ram" of five German divisions, ^{Note 5} parts of two others attacked it in the course of the morning.

Here the deepest penetration into the Allied defences was made, and as this naturally affected the British, a few words must be said about it, before the operations of the IX. Corps are described from left to right ^{Note 6}

Against odds of five to one, the French 22nd Division, after its severe bombardment, could offer no prolonged resistance. By 5.30 a.m. the enemy was in possession of the Chemin des Dames in its sector (F.C.A. vi. (ii.), p. 93) and by 9 a.m. was nearing the Aisne, his front covered by low-flying aeroplanes and small parties with light machine guns leading. By 10 a.m. the bridge over the river at Œuilly (1½ miles east of Bourg), within a mile of the British sector, although covered by a special bridge-head, was in German hands ^{Note 7} and by midday the bridges at Bourg and Pont Arcy, to the west, had also been lost.

Further to the east, the enemy was across both the river and the canal between Maizy (for the bridge there, the French were responsible) and Œuilly. Thus the Aisne line in the 22nd Division sector had been lost, but Villers en Prayeres, across the canal south of Œuilly, was well defended and not taken until about 12.30 p.m.

On the west, the French 21st Division had also been driven back, and by 11 a.m. the Germans had captured the passages of the Lisne at Chavonne and Vailly, the next two below Pont Arcy, but beyond this a defensive flank had been formed to limit the enemy torrent. ^{Note 8}

The British 50th Division (Major-General H. C. Jackson) had not to face quite such heavy odds as the French 22nd, but was attacked by at least three German divisions. (F.O.A. vi. (ii.), p. 89, says four.)

The Californie Plateau, regarded by the Germans as "the key of the Chemin des Dames position", held by the 150th Brigade (Br. -General H. C. Rees), the left brigade, is flat-topped and steep-sided; standing about three hundred and fifty feet above the Lilette; its slopes were still covered with scattered bushes, but its top had been churned by digging and shell-fire into a welter of shallow ditches and shell craters.

Three regiments were sent against it. Avoiding the very steep northern face, the enemy first attacked the north-eastern corner and Chevreux, a village in the line in the low-lying ground east of it, whilst the barrage was kept on the plateau for some time after it had advanced on the rest of the front. By about 4.30 a.m. the Germans were beginning to climb the eastern face of the plateau, and at the same time, having broken through the French 22nd Division on the left, they soon afterwards attacked from the west, and of the 5/Green Howards and 4/East Yorkshire and their attached troops only small parties managed to get away.

Lieut.-Colonel J. L. R. Thomson (5/Green Howards), from his headquarters at Craonne, ^{Note 9} saw enemy troops on the southern edge of the Californie plateau about 6 a.m., and, with his headquarters and the reserve company of the 4/East Yorkshire, made a gallant attempt to dislodge them by counter-attack; but the ascent was steep and the effort failed with heavy casualties. A company of the 4/Green Howards, the reserve battalion, near La Hutte, about a mile south of Craonne, tried, by Br.-General Rees's orders, to co-operate in this counter-attack, but was swept away by the terrific fire falling near La Hutte. The buried cable to the 5/Green Howards being intact, Br.-General Rees ordered the survivors of the counter-attack to fight their way out but not many succeeded in doing so, and Lieut.-Colonel Thomson was killed. Soon after, the 4/Green Howards were attacked on both flanks and eventually from the rear. The remnants retired south-westwards to Craonnelle, and made a stand among the ruined houses there: but Lieut.-Colonel R. E. D. Kent was killed, and by 8 a.m. nearly the whole battalion had been killed or captured. The headquarters of the 150th Brigade had already left La Hutte, and were making for a chateau (La Terrasse), about three-quarters of a mile south of Craonnelle, but when they reached it the enemy was already approaching from the west, several of the brigade staff were wounded, and Br.-General Rees was eventually captured whilst trying to cross the Aisne. By 8 a.m., therefore, the 150th Brigade, except the usual detachments left in billets for administrative duties, had ceased to exist.

The front companies of the 151st Brigade (Br.-General C. T. Martin), attacked on the left and in front, were soon overwhelmed; the reserves offered further resistance on the Switch Line, and in the Intermediate Line on the northern edge of the Bois de Beau Marais, where the enemy was held up for about three quarters of an hour. But each position was in turn outflanked and surrounded, and the 6th and 8/Durham L.T., and the pioneer company (7/Durham L. I.) with them, were thus put out of action.

Two companies of the 5/Durham L.I., the brigade reserve, in the Centre d'Evreux, covering Pontavert on the Aisne, were ordered forward by Br.-General Martin; but they ran into a German regiment which was advancing after having captured part of the (Battle) Zone, and, after a fight at close quarters, were driven back. Another company of the battalion joined them, the fourth being captured in its dug-outs, and a stand was made in the Centre d'Evreux, garrisoned by two field companies R.E. and the remaining two pioneer companies, until towards 8 a.m., by which time the Germans were all round the Centre. A shell now killed Br.-General Martin and severely wounded Br.-General Riddell (149th Brigade), who had joined him, besides scattering the Germans who had closed in. The 151st Brigade was no longer an organised formation, but scattered parties continued to put up a fight in various trenches at hand. At Cuiry on the north bank of the Aisne a small force of all battalions checked the enemy advance, and was not dislodged until about 11 a.m., when it was taken in rear from the west, from Beaurieux, 50th Division headquarters. Here the Germans had arrived from the French area soon after 9.30 a.m.; most of the staff were able to escape, divisional headquarters being re-opened at Breuil, on the Vesle; but three officers and some clerks were captured. Higher up stream at Chaudardes, some of the 5/Durham L.I., mixed with men of the 149th Brigade, made a good stand.

The 149th Brigade (Br.-General E. P. Riddell) had only the 4/Northumberland Fusiliers in the front zone, with two companies disposed as outposts on the hook-shaped spur in which the Chemin des Dames ridge terminates, as it had been decided to hold as the real front a line of posts near the Reims - Corbény road on the reverse slope. To this line, manned by a third company, the survivors of the bombardment withdrew, and there checked the enemy's advance. But, with the assistance of four tanks, he soon broke through and advanced against the Switch Line, held by three companies, the remaining company of the 4th and two of the 6/Northumberland Fusiliers. 1. good stand was made; but here again enemy tanks turned and overwhelmed the right flank near Ville aux Bois, and the trenches were lost, Behind them, in the Battle Zone, were four small French redoubts, including Centre Marceau, occupied by the headquarters of the 4th and 6/Northumberland Fusiliers and the two remaining companies of the latter. But by 6 a.m. the enemy had taken one of the redoubts and the Butte d'Edmond, a post on a knoll behind the left of the line, whose four machine guns had been knocked out by the bombardment. The other redoubts held out much longer; but finally all were surrounded and captured. Lieut. - Colonel B. D. Gibson of the 4/Northumberland Fusiliers was killed, and except for small parties, both this battalion and the 6th had been overcome.

At 5.15 a.m. Br.-General Riddell had ordered two companies of his third battalion, the 5/Northumberland Fusiliers, in reserve at Pontavert in the valley of the Aisne, to rein-force the Battle Zone; but the message did not arrive until 6.10 a.m., and on approaching the Butte d'Edmond, now in the enemy's hands, the companies received such heavy fire that they were unable to go farther. At 6.30 a.m. the two remaining companies, under Major I. M. Tweedy, the officer commanding, which were suffering from an intense barrage, were ordered to come up to the Centre d'Evreux; but here, as already related, the enemy had gained possession before they could arrive, and Br.-General Riddell had been wounded. The command of the 149th Brigade now devolved upon Major I. M. Tweedy, whose decimated companies were now all that remained of its three battalions.

It was impossible to hold on facing the Centre d'Evreux, so he withdrew them down the valley of the Aisne to Chaudardes, where, with some of the 5/Durham L.I. (151st Brigade), as already mentioned, a stand was made until about 11 a.m., when, as the enemy was on both flanks, the survivors of the 5/Northumberland Fusiliers fell back across the Aisne, the only remaining formed body of the infantry of the 50th Division.

Its artillery (CCL. and CCLI. Brigades and French I./203rd Regiment, under Br.-General W. Stirling) had fared no better than its infantry. In spite of heavy losses, from the barrage which continued on the battery positions until after 7 a.m., it had remained in action. No sooner had enemy gun fire ceased than the German infantry burst in, so that, by about 8 a.m., the whole of the 50th Division artillery, both French and British, had been destroyed or captured. A few men got away, and were able in some cases to carry off breach blocks and dial sights. ^{Note 10}

The 8th Division (Major-General W. C. G. Heneker), on the right of the 50th, was attacked by two German divisions and one infantry regiment of a third - 21 fresh against 9 battered battalions.

(Handwritten note in margin in the handwriting of Col. C.A.S. Page, C.O. 2/ Middlesex:- "Front line should read "Outpost". This was a French disposition. Lt. Colonel Lowry telephoned to me 5 a.m. that he was falling back according to orders. Soon afterwards I heard that he had passed through to the rear slightly wounded". Note continues on next page referring to 2/Middlesex:- "NO. At about 5 or 5.30 I was on standby telephone with my (unreadable) front line companies. They had checked the Germans at 200 - 600 yards by rifle and Lewis Gun fire.")

(Col. Page added a hand written report to the War Diary after the war describing the fight on 27th. May, transcript available here.)

On the left, the 23rd Brigade (Br.-General G. W. St. G. Grogan) had three companies of the 2/West Yorkshire in front line, with the fourth in support. The German assault was checked for a short time by the front line; but the bombardment had caused heavy casualties, numbers told and the battalion was broken through. The enemy advance towards the Battle Zone was very rapid, and by about 5 a.m. the 2/Middlesex; occupying it, was also overwhelmed. There remained the brigade reserve, the 2/Devonshire, in the Bois des Buttes, which covers a conical hill south-west of Ville aux Bois. This battalion had been sheltered in the tunnels pierced through the hill, and; although gas masks had to be worn, it escaped the heavy losses from the first part of the bombardment which the other two battalions had suffered. No news came from the front and, as the atmosphere in the tunnels had become almost unbearable about. 4 a.m., directly it got light, Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Anderson-Morshead ordered the trenches on the northern edge of the Bois des Buttes, at the back of the Battle Zone, to be manned by three companies, keeping one company in support in the wood. Shelling was still heavy and many casualties were incurred before the trenches could be reached. Within an hour, by 5.15 a.m., the Devonshire was engaged with the enemy infantry which was advancing in large numbers. The artillery which might have given support was already out of action, and the Devonshire had to rely on infantry weapons alone, but a splendid .resistance was made. For two or three hours they held out, the remnants even making charges as the enemy closed in. But the Germans were in too superior numbers and, pressing into the gap on the left between the Bois des Buttes and Butte d’Edmond; now open owing to the destruction of the 149th Brigade, enveloped and turned the left flank.

Between 7 and 8 a.m. the three Devonshire companies were overwhelmed, very few men getting away. Meanwhile, the headquarters and the support company held on to the Bois des Buttes hill. It was not till the enemy had broken through the front companies and, on the left flank, was far in his rear, that Lieut.-Colonel Anderson-Morshead decided to retire to trenches south of the hill and fight a rear-guard action back to the Aisne**. During this fighting he was killed. By this time the enemy was already in Pontavert, and only about fifty men of the Devonshire, many of them wounded, got back across the Aisne. ^{Note 11}

(**Handwritten note in margin in the handwriting of Col. C.A.S. Page, C.O. 2/ Middlesex:-"This is completely at variance with the story told me by Captian Worshall 2/Middlesex Regt. who was with Col. Anderson-Morshead when he was killed.")

The 24th Brigade (Br.-General R. Haig), holding the centre of the 8th Division, had, like the 23rd, three companies of the 2/Northamptonshire in the front line, on the forward slopes of the ridge, the valley of the Miette forming its right boundary. Heavily attacked at 3.40 a.m., it fell back gradually on to the Battle Zone. Here the 1/Worcestershire was in position, and, with the survivors of the Northamptonshire, made a fine defence. Towards 5 a.m. the enemy was attacking this line in force.

He was at first beaten back; but again weight of numbers told and the flank was turned by an advance up the Miette valley. Finally the defence was overwhelmed, Lieut.-Colonel C.G. Buokle, commanding the Northamptonshire, and Major J. B. F. Cartland, commanding the Worcestershire, both being killed. By 6 a.m. the two front battalions of the brigade had been destroyed. The headquarters, about half a mile behind the Battle Zone, were attacked with hand grenades about this time and the staff had to fight their way out. They had no reserve; for the third battalion, the 1/Sherwood Foresters, was in divisional reserve-

The 25th Brigade (Br.-General R. H. Husey) on the right of the 24th, occupied a curved line which formed the right flank of the Chemin des Dames position, and faced northeast round to south-east, on two low hills with a depression between them, the right wing being roughly parallel to the Aisne, and a quarters to three-quarters of a mile from it. On the left was the 2/Royal Berkshire, next on the right the 2/Rifle Brigade, each with two companies in the front trenches. The support and reserve companies of the Rifle Brigade were responsible for the line further south where the Aisne separated the British from the Germans, whilst further south again, near Berry au Bac, were two companies of the 2/East Lancashire. The enemy attacked the northern half of the sector with tanks, and also crossed the Aisne and made a converging attack on the weakly held southern part of the line. Heavy casualties had been suffered in the bombardment, and by 5 a.m., though some parts of the front line held un until surrounded, the enemy was through both the Forward Zone and the Battle Zone, and the few survivors of the two and ^{Note 11}.half battalions involved fell back across the Aisne. ^{Note 12}

The brigade headquarters, north of Berry au Bac, had been surrounded before it was known that the front line had gone, and the staff had to fight their way out to the Gernicourt Defences, the brigade major being killed. Later in the day, Br.-General Husey was badly wounded, and died three days afterwards in German hands.

The 15th Field Company R.E. in the 8th Division area, and the 446th in the 50th Division area, as the troops retired, blew up or burnt practically all the bridges over the Aisne and its canal in the British sector behind them, on the responsibility of the engineer officers on the spot, from Berry au Bac (inclusive) to Maizy (exclusive for which the French were responsible). The 15th Field Company, which had blown up the bridge over the Miette at 7 a.m., accounted for all in the divisional sector except one, 22; the 446th, for 15 out of 19, suffering a good deal from bombardment, losing 4 officers and 46 men, and thus having the strength of its parties considerably reduced. Without any authority from the French Sixth Army, ^{Note 13}

Lieut. General Gordon had issued orders through his Chief Engineer, Br.-General G. S. Cartwright, at 12.30 a.m. for the final preparations to be made, and work was started about 4.30 a.m. after boats and other apparatus, including the keys of the demolition chambers made by the French had been collected; in some cases the keys could not be found and the doors had to be burst open. ^{Note 14}

The 8th Division artillery (Br.-General J. Lamont) met with the same fate as that of the 50th Division. All the field guns in action, both British and French, were lost. ^{Note 15}

South of the Aisne, behind the 25th Brigade sector, were the Gernicourt Defences, with a special garrison under Lieut.-Colonel B.C. James (22/Durham L.I.), who was under the direct orders of the division.

The village of Gernicourt, as already mentioned, stands well above the river and commands all the ground to the front, but it was liable to be turned through the woods on the east. The garrison, two companies of the 22nd Durham L.I. (Pioneers), the 2nd Battalion of the French 23rd Territorial Regiment (less one company), eight British and sixteen French machine guns, was reinforced in the early morning of the 27th by two companies of the 2/East Lancashire and by parts of the 2nd and 490th Field Companies R.E.; ^{Note 16} and after the attack on the front zones, some survivors of the forward battalions also joined it. About 5 a.m. orders were sent by the 8th Division for the 1/Sherwood Foresters and 8 machine guns to move up from divisional reserve at Roucy to the Bois de Gernicourt, on the left of the Gernicourt Defences. They reached the north edge of the Bois de Gernicourt about 7 a.m., in time to see all the bridges over the Aisne canal in this sector, except one, blown up, and to take up a position to prevent the enemy from crossing the Aisne canal, from which position they gained touch on the right with the troops holding Gernicourt. The only intact bridge being under heavy fire, the Germans ^{Note 17} were held up here for some hours. Meanwhile, other Germans, ^{Note 18} after taking Berry au Bac; found a practicable crossing west of that place, and advanced on the wood southeast of Gernicourt. A right defensive flank facing east was formed to stop them, and here also the attack was held for a considerable time. On the other flank, the enemy, who had crossed the Aisne and the canal between the Bois de Gernicourt and Pontavert, apparently by a temporary bridge was able to enfilade the Sherwood Foresters with machine guns. ^{Note 19}

A left defensive flank was therefore formed at the north-west corner of the Bois de Gernicourt, facing west. Pressure on both flanks continued, and about 1 p.m., when nearly surrounded, the survivors of the Sherwood Foresters and the garrison of the Gernicourt Defences retired to the Green Line, and the guns of the CX Brigade R.F.A. (25th Division) and a trench groupe besides a number of heavy guns had to be abandoned. ^{Note 20} Isolated parties continued to resist even up to 2 or 3 p.m. Less than ten companies had held up twelve enemy battalions for over six hours. ^{Note 21}

On the right of the 8th Division, south of the Aisne, the 21st Division. held a front of nearly five miles, on flat ground, with all three brigades in the line. Each brigade had two battalions in the Forward and Battle Zones and one battalion in reserve. Between the two zones ran the Aisne and Marne canal, about twenty yards wide, unfordable though not quite full of water, with swampy ground on each side. The front line of the Battle Zone which consisted of a chain of redoubts running in front of the Berry au Bac - Reims road on the right, and behind that road on the left, was considered the main line of resistance. The Forward Zone had the canal behind it, but:

although Lieut. General Gordon had protested against having to hold this zone in strength, on account of the canal any withdrawal from it had been forbidden by General Duchêne, even if a great enemy offensive seemed

imminent. The division was attacked at first by one German division and part of another, but later, part of a third from the 8th Division front turned it from the north. All the eleven companies which were east of the Aisne - Marne canal suffered the same fate. ^{Note 22}

In the dark the Forward Zone was quickly broken through, and very few men succeeded in making their way back across the canal, although the three permanent bridges and some of the temporary wooden bridges were intact, as in the dark and confusion it had been impossible to judge when to destroy or remove them. By 7a:m. the enemy was attacking the Battle Zone, his pressure being greatest on the left. But here, with the support of the divisional artillery, a good resistance was offered.

In the 62nd Brigade (Br.-General G. H. Gater), the 1/Lincolnshire, in brigade reserve at Chalons le Vergeur, 4 miles in rear of the front, with 4 machine guns, had been ordered, at 5.12 a.m., to the Green Line in front and north of Cormiey. On their left the Lincolnshire found the 1st Battalion of the French 23rd Territorial Regiment, which had been placed under the 62nd Brigade, and in Cormicy itself was a company of the pioneers (14/Northumberland Fusiliers).

By 10 a.m. the remnants of the two forward battalions had been driven from the Battle Zone and were retiring to the Green Line, which the enemy soon began to attack. Three assaults on Cormicy were repulsed by the right companies of the 1/Lincolnshire, and at 2 p.m. they were still in position. North of the village its two left companies and the French Territorials were holding on, but the advance of Germans from the 8th Division front through the Bois de Gernicourt was threatening their left.

In the Battle Zone of the 110th Brigade (Br.-General H. R. Cumming) a good resistance was made. Two attacks were repulsed with rifle and Lewis-gun fire, so the enemy, covered by light trench mortars, resorted to bombing up the communication trenches, and gradually, between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m., he succeeded in surrounding and capturing the different strong-points of which the line consisted. During the course of the morning, the C/Leicestershire, in brigade reserve, and a company formed from nucleus parties of the 7th and 8/Leicestershire which had been kept back, had been sent up to the Green Line between Cauroy and the Cormicy road, and, after the gradual loss of the Battle Zone, this, as in the 62nd Brigade, now became the front line.

The Battle Zone of the 64th Brigade (Br.-General H. R. Headlam) held out for some hours, and was not finally in the enemy's possession till about 11 a.m., when the remnants of the 9/K.O.Y.L.I. and the 1/East Yorkshire fell back on the Green Line near Cauroy, held by the 15/Durham L.I., the reserve battalion, which had been moved up during the bombardment, and by the remaining two companies of the pioneers.

The 1/East Yorkshire was then withdrawn into reserve. About noon, Lieut.-General Gordon telephoned to Major-General Campbell that the enemy had crossed the Aisne and that this might cut off the 21st Division: he was therefore to be prepared with a plan for pivoting on his right in touch with the French 40th Division back, to the St. Auboeuf - Guyencourt position, a mile and a half in rear of the Green line.

On the right of the IX. Corps, the French 45th Division, composed partly of Zouaves and partly of African troops, was not so heavily attacked as the troops further to the west. Although it could not prevent the enemy from crossing the Aisne and Marne canal, the division held its ground behind this waterway, forming a defensive flank on its left when the right of the British 21st Division was driven back. The artillery of the 21st Division (Br.-General H. W. Newcome) did not suffer so heavily as that of the other two front-line divisions. The XCIV. Brigade R.F.A., in the Cauroy area kept up fire on the S.O.S. line till 8 a.m., when, at the request of the 64th Brigade, the barrage was brought back to protect the Battle Zone. The continued advance of the enemy subsequently made a withdrawal of the batteries necessary, and at 11.30 a.m. the retirement to previously reconnoitred positions on the St. Auboeuf - Guyencourt position was begun, the last battery not withdrawing till about 3 p.m. The movement was carried out without the loss of guns. The XCV. Brigade R.F.A. also brought back its barrage to protect the Battle Zone at 8 a.m. B/XCV., on the extreme left, was threatened by the enemy's advance on the 8th Division front, and was ordered to retire at 10 a.m.; but the order took time to reach it, and before it arrived the battery was surrounded by the enemy, and only one gun out of the six was saved. The remainder of the brigade withdrew between 11 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. to positions behind the Green Line West of Calons le Vergeur, D/XCV. having to abandon two guns. The CXII. Brigade R.F.A. (25th Division artillery, but under the 21st Division), near St. Auboeuf, was heavily shelled, but was able to maintain its position and cover the retirement of the 21st Division artillery.

The heavy artillery of the IX Corps had fared little better than the field artillery. The guns covering the 50th Division were all north of the Aisne, and those covering the 8th Division were chiefly in the Bois de Gernicourt. All these, comprising the LXXVII. Brigade R.G.A. and the French Groupes d'Ainval and Dubarry, were destroyed or had to be abandoned. The only heavy guns still available on the left flank of the IX. Corps after midday were nine guns of the LXXVII. Brigade which had not come into action, and of these, only two 60-pdr. could be used, the other being temporarily unserviceable.

On the right of the corps, covering the 21st Division, the XLI. Brigade R.G.A. and the French Groupe Meurier, in emplacements behind the Green Line, were able to maintain their positions, and it was not until the evening that they had to withdraw.

Thus the Green Line (French Second Position) had between 1 and 2 p.m. become the front of the 21st Division. It had a good field of fire down a gentle slope to the front, but was liable to be turned on the left flank through the thick woods to the north near Gernicourt, and on this flank, except for scattered parties still fighting, the 8th and 50th Divisions had disappeared. Only the 25th Division(less its artillery, attached to the forward divisions), moved up into the IX. Corps area, remained intact. The aeroplanes of No. 52 Squadron R.A.F. the only British squadron in the area, had not been able to furnish any assistance. Flying over the battlefield to report the German advance and find targets for the artillery they encountered opposition at once from low-flying enemy machines ahead of the troops, and could not hold the field. Their aerodrome at Fismes was systematically shelled with increasing severity as the day went on; so in the afternoon the squadron was forced to move back to Cramaille (10 miles S.S.E. of Soissons).

Away in the west, on the left flank of the French 22nd Division, the 21st, though fresh, had fared no better than the tired British 50th and 8th Divisions. It occupied a front of about six miles, from in front of Braye (exclusive) to the Fora de Pinon (exclusive) beyond Malmaison. By frontal attack, and by flank attack from the sector of the 22nd Division, it was swept away south-eastwards by three German divisions, and its artillery captured. A stand was made in the centre and left portions of the Battle Zone, which here faced north-eastwards, by the reserve battalion and the remnants of the garrison of the First Position. But at 10.40 a.m. the divisional commander reported to General Maud'huy (XI. Corps) that he “judged it an delusion to think of defending the Intermediate Position, (Battle Zone) that his regiments were at the end of their powers, and that the Second Position (Green Line) must be occupied. He, for his part, abandoned the idea of employing north of the Aisne the regiment of the 39th Division which he had been authorized to send there, and had placed it in the Second Position south of the river. At 11 a.m. the Germans, turning the defenders of Rouge Maison [The right flank of the Inter- mediate Line] reached Vailly [on the Aisne] where they seized the bridges, and Chavonne [above Vailly].” ^{Note 23}

The left division of the French XI. Corps, the 61st, held a bastion of the front about seven miles in length, covered at close range by the Oise - Aisne canal, from the Forêt de Pinon (inclusive) to Vauxaillon (inclusive), slanting three miles forward of the Chemin des Dames. It was attacked at first by two German divisions, and later by a third, which, avoiding a frontal attack through the Fork de Pinon, which was Marshy, advanced on each side of it.

Three French battalions (one of the 21st Division), although surrounded, held out in the forest most of the day, and considerably hampered enemy progress. The Germans, however, continued their advance up the valleys on each side of the forest, by Chavignon (in the 21st Division sector) on the east and by Pinon on the west. By 8 a.m. they had reached Malmaison Fort and Allemant, and by nine o'clock were on the top of the Chemin des Dames ridge. Here they were held for a time by the French reserve battalions in the Intermediate Position, on the line l'Ange Gardien - Laffaux. Further to the left, the French still held Vauxaillon and the hill to the west of it in the First Position.

Next on the left, the 151st Division (XXX. Corps) was little molested. Early in the morning the enemy crossed the Oise and Aisne canal at Pont à Courson and got a footing on the Mont des Tombes, a hill north-east of Leuilly; but a counter-attack succeeded in preventing any further advance in this direction. Thus, by 11 a.m., the front of the attack was clearly defined as between the French 151st Division on the left and the French 45th Division on the right. The French front then ran, beginning on the west, from the right of the 151st in the First Position to the 61st Division sector in the Intermediate Position; between this and the Aisne, and along that river, in the Second Position (Green Line) as far as the British left there were troops in position, but the enemy was, in places, across the river.

The French air service, like the British had not been able to give either the troops or General Duchêne much assistance. As the bombardment soon destroyed all communication with the front, it was not until after 5 a.m. that French Sixth Army headquarters at Belleu (2 miles south-east of the centre of Soissons) learnt that an infantry attack had been launched and had made a little progress at three or four places. The divisional headquarters knew no more. But messages which arrived between 6 and 7 a.m. left no doubt as to the success achieved against the French 21st and 22nd Divisions and the British 50th and 8th, and made it certain that the enemy infantry had captured a very considerable portion of the Chemin des Dames ridge and the Californie Plateau, and were at Ville an Bois. What was happening on the left flank, on the front of the 61st Division, was obscure, but the 45th Division, on the right, appeared to be holding its own. The danger point seemed to be between the 22nd and 21st Divisions.

At 6.55 a.m., therefore, disregarding General Petain’s instructions that no reserve divisions should be sent north of the Aisne, General Duchne, decided to put the 157th Division at the disposal of General Maud'huy, to be interpolated between the 22nd and 21st Divisions; at the same time, in addition to its original mission of holding on to the Chemin des Dames, he made the XI. Corps responsible for the defence of the Second Position (Green Line) from the boundary with the British, near Villers en Prayeres to Cys, that is behind the 22nd Division and the right of the 21st Division. All the artillery (9 field batteries, 3 of 120 mm. L, 5 of 155 mm. and 1 of 145 mm.) on this position was to be left there.

Towards 7.30 a.m. he authorized Lieut.- General Gordon, "who had already asked several times to be allowed to dispose of the 25th Division, to send one brigade of this division north of the Aisne, with a view to supporting the 8th and 50th Divisions."

As early as 5.10 a.m., the French 21st Division, too, had asked for a battalion to support its right next the 22nd; but General Duchêne did not respond until 7.45, when he allotted a regiment of the 39th Division, but he reminded General Maud'huy that the Division was responsible for the Second Position (Green Line) from Cys to Celles, behind the left of the 21st and the right of the 61st, and that the artillery (6 field batteries and 2 of 145 mm.) must remain south of the river. He then decided to order the 39th and 74th Divisions to occupy the Green Line from Cys to Celles, where it left the Aisne, and thence to Margival, near Pont Rouge, in the Intermediate Position (Battle Zone) of the 61^st Division. Thus attempts were made to hold the whole of the Green Line behind the front where the Germans had broken it. At the same time: General Duchêne requested the G.A.N. to send him not only the 13th and 1st Divisions, but to provide others and the staff of a corps without delay, informing General Franchet d'Esperey that a prisoner taken had stated that many divisions were being employed and the intention was, as a first objective, to reach the Aisne. ^{Note 24}

None of the information received by General Duchêne between 7.45 and 9 a.m. seemed to indicate that the situation in the centre had grown any worse, although on the left the enemy was reported to have reached the plateau south of the Forêt de Pinon. On the right, the British 21st Division had been driven back to the Intermediate Position (Battle Zone) and the 45th Division, on its right, had some difficulty in keeping connection.

Thus, at 9 a.m., when the Germans were nearing the Aisne, owing to the delay in the arrival of information, the situation appeared to the Sixth Army to be that the enemy had captured the line of resistance selected by General Duchêne, except on the wings, but there seemed every hope of stopping or delaying his further advance. Between 10 and 11 a.m. the reports which came in revealed the gravity of the position and left no doubt that it would be impossible to stop the enemy short of the Second Position (Green Line). At 11.15 a.m. General Duchêne issued the following order to General de Maud'huy: "Withdraw your troops to the Second Position, which must remain inviolable. The 39th and 157th Divisions are placed at your disposal.” Wherever the enemy has crossed the Aisne or the Second Position, he must be attacked and thrown back A quarter of an hour earlier he had delegated to his corps commanders authority to destroy the bridges in their areas when thought necessary; but the message to the British IX. Corps was not sent off till 12.30p.m., ^{Note 8}

Fortunately, Lieut. - General Gordon had not waited for such authority. The next phase of the action was the attempt to hold the Green Line Sectors of this position had been allotted by Major-General Sir G. Bainbridge to the brigades of the 25th Division, from left to right as follows;

74th Brigade (Br.-General H. M. Craigie-Halkett) from Maizy (inclusive) along the Aisne to Concevreux (inclusive);

75th Brigade (Br.-General A. A. Kennedy) from Concevreux (exclusive), where the line left the river to Bouffignereux (inclusive);

7th Brigade (Br. -General C. J. Griffin), with the 6/South Wales Borderers (Pioneers) attached, from Bouffignereux (exclusive), along a line of redoubts about a mile behind the Green Line to Hermonville (inclusive).

A machine-gun company having been allotted to each bridge, only one company and the 105th, 196th and 130th Field Companies R.E. remained in reserve. The artillery had, as we have seen, been attached to the forward divisions, except one section of each battery of the XC. Brigade R.F.A., which had been retained.

Under instructions from the LK. Corps, Major-General Bainbridge, at 5.20 a.m., issued orders for a nucleus garrison to occupy the Green Line. This was to consist of one platoon from each company and eight machine guns for each brigade front. The sector of the 7th Brigade being a long one, five miles in fact, the whole of the 6/South Wales Borderers (Pioneers) was to occupy as a nucleus garrison the right half of the line. It was not, as we have seen, until 7.30 a.m., after repeated requests, that General Duchêne placed the 25th Division at Lieut.-General Gordon's disposal, with permission to send a brigade across the Aisne to support the 50^th and 8th Divisions, Instructions were then issued for the full occupation of the Green Line by all three brigades; one field company R.E. was placed by the division at the disposal of each brigade, and four extra machine guns each were allotted to the 74th and 75th Brigades, These brigades were in position by about 11 a.m., The divisional orders took some time to reach the 7th Brigade, and its last troops were not in position till between 1 and 2 p.m.

Under instructions from Lieut.-General Sir A. H. Gordon, one battalion from each of the 74th and 75th Brigades had been directed, about 8 a.m.; to move to Chaudardes and Pontavert, on the Aisne, respectively a mile and two miles beyond the Green Line, to assist the troops in front. But before they could arrive there the enemy was reported to be in possession of the two places, and neither of the battalions actually went further than the Green Line. Remnants of the 50th Division and 8th Division which had retired across the Aisne, and some reinforcements from Lewis Gun Schools, and regimental nucleus parties joined the troops of the 25th

Division in the Green Line and came under the orders of the brigadiers; but at 1.20 p.m. IX. Corps issued orders (received by the 25th - Division at 2.15 p.m.) that the 74th Brigade was to come under the 50th Division, the 75th under the 8th Division, and the 7th Brigade under the 21st Division. Major-General Bainbridge thus ceased for the time to exercise any command over his troops.

The German Preparations for the Attack.

The assembly of thirty additional divisions ^{Note 25} and some thousand additional batteries, besides trench mortars, on a front of thirty-five miles was in itself a considerable task; but success depended on the operations being concealed from the enemy and his complete surprise. Allied observation balloons were up on every favourable day, yet their attack by aircraft, in order not to awaken suspicion, might not exceed the normal. The inhabitants of the area were of course hostile, and in one corps area alone four baskets of carrier pigeons were discovered, obviously dropped by aeroplanes, with directions as to what information should be sent back. The region was certainly thickly wooded, with trees in leaf, practically untouched by the War, right down to the Ailette. Yet the noise of the preparations might be heard, as thousands of guns, hundreds of trench mortars, must be dug in well to the front; for weeks innumerable vehicles, night after night, must transport an enormous amount of ammunition and material as far forward as the front infantry line.

In order to deceive the Allies, thirty,. assault divisions were left opposite the British in Flanders and in the Somme area. Extra bivouac fires were lighted there; large number of troops were marched about; telephones, wireless and visual signalling were kept busy; and many air attacks against the rear areas were made in order to distract attention from the Aisne front. Most thorough precautions for secrecy were, however, taken in the latter area.

The following is a summary of the measures ordered:

I. In every corps, division and brigade staff, every artillery and engineer command, and anti-aircraft and air formation, members of these staffs are to be appointed as responsible executive officers for the measures required.

II. In corps and divisions, officers will be appointed to test the measures of precaution.

III. Every corps and division area will be divided into sub-areas, so as to form a net-work every space in which is constantly watched.

IV. Only the Corps commanders, their chiefs of the staff, and their operation officers must know of the activities of the above officers. Success lies in the secrecy of the system.

Matters to be watched:

a) In the front positions:

No new work which is not at once covered up or camouflaged; in the latter case efficacy must be tested by airmen. No secret papers or secret instructions taken beyond the regimental battle headquarters. Observation of telephone discipline and wireless. Guard against enemy overhearing; note behaviour of officers and men when unknown persons - of whatever rank - appear in the trenches on any occasion. Arrest even on suspicion. Concealment of distinguishing marks of arm and rank when visiting forward positions. Conspicuous articles of equipment and dress (officers' caps, officers' greatcoats, map cases, spread-out maps, etc.) to be avoided. Ploughing over of beaten paths leading to positions, shelters, headquarters.

(b) In localities, hutments or on roads, no signboards with number of unit (only the name of the commander). Lights to be covered at night. No wagon park, parade place, refilling point, supply column, to be in the open; either under trees, sheds or gateways, or close to buildings. By day no march column larger than a company or battery except at considerable intervals. Larger movements only by night or in misty weather. During night marches, no noise, singing or bands. Absolute silence as positions are approached, no rattling of equipment, wheels to be muffled; if necessary, noise to be drowned by artillery fire. If enemy aeroplanes appear, take cover at once; keep roads clear, on occasion turn about.

(c) Office work: secret material to be kept locked up by officers. Unobtrusive watching night and day. Test locks of secret cupboards and boxes. Particularly secret matters to be written and drawn by officers.

(d) Conversations in officers' clubs, can-teens, soldiers' homes, etc., to be watched by special confidential agents. Unobtrusive intercourse. Caution as regards orderlies.

(e) Refilling points: no assembly on roads; rapidity; no markings on wagons. Observation of transport, and of transfer, and issue of postal matter.

(f) Area Commandants: Testing of passes. Regulation of movements of inhabitants and workmen. Search of houses. Look out for suspected persons. Inspection of small parties on special duties.

(g) Railways: No markings on trucks; rapid unloading and loading. Rapid entraining and detraining and leaving of stations. March from these only at night. Formal parading only if there is cover near at hand. Look out for suspected persons. Examine passes very carefully.

A number of new aerodromes had to be prepared, but no aeroplane might make use of them until the 27th, and even on that day the airmen had to start from the old aerodromes, well in rear. No balloon went to its station until the night of the 26th/ 27th.

Look-outs were placed to give warning of the approach of enemy aircraft, when all hands took cover from view.

The air inspection brought a number of new points to notice: e.g., too many horses grazing at the same time, too much smoke, some stations too brightly lit up, motor lorries made too much dust.

In order to mislead the position divisions as long as possible as regards the reinforcements coming up, they were informed that a great attack was expected and that a few tired divisions were being rested behind their front. Any registration by the artillery was forbidden. Each gun was only allowed to fire one test round. Two thousand, five hundred miles of telephone cable was provided, principally for the artillery, but for the first advance, wire- less carried by hand was mainly relief on; every other kind of signal apparatus, carried on pack animals, was provided, including submarine cable to be laid over the Ailette. The first batteries began to arrive on the 14th May, the last on the 23rd. The "mass of all batteries" had to be in position before daylight on the 26th, in order to leave the roads clear for the infantry on the last night; bat there was not concealment available for all the batteries, so some of them were hidden in woods, villages, gardens, etc., in the neighbourhood, and man-handled into position on the night of the 25th/26th; a few which could not thus be moved were brought up by horse teams during the night of the 26th/27th. All the batteries, except twenty, were dug in by daylight on the 26th. If batteries had to march across the fields, their tracks were ploughed over. The dumping of ammunition (22 days' full supply near the guns, 1 day's in the wagons; 1i days' in divisional dump; and 1 day's in corps dump), should have been completed on the night of the 22nd, but was not until four days later. All the work was done at night. To give some idea of its magnitude, it is stated that for the 210 batteries of one corps, 320,000 shell of all calibre had been carried. The bringing up of trench-mortar ammunition (30 rounds per heavy, 50 per medium,. 100-150 per light trench mortar) close to the front line, gave even greater trouble.

The deployment of divisions without their artillery, gave less trouble. The reconnoitring officers began to arrive on the 16th to make preparations: the first troops, partly by rail but mainly by march, appeared in the battle area on the 21st, and leaving their baggage behind, moved to assembly places not more than three or four miles behind the line, or to their actual position of readiness when this afforded concealment from view, on the evening of the 24th. All were in position at midnight of the 26th/27th.

On account of the obstacles formed by the Oise - Aisne canal and the Ailette, the engineer preparations had to be very elaborate. An example from the corps opposite the French 22nd Division is given.

a) Preparations: construction of 24 foot- bridges in each divisional sector for the 'passage of the Ailette, and the dumping of the material as far forward as possible and Reconnaissance of these places and the routes to them. Preparation of and placing ready numerous bridges for the passage of the marshy ground in the Ailette bottom, after reconnaissance. Repair of main roads as far as the southern edges of the villages between Grandelain and Neuville. [These villages are only about a quarter of a mile from the Ailette,] Collection of the necessary material for the passage of the cratered zone, for the repair of roads (particularly broken stone) between the above-named village line and the crest of the Chemin des Dames. Collection of materials for the construction of five heavy bridges over the Ailette and for bridges over the Aisne.

b) As soon as the artillery bombardment begins: Picking up and carriage of the bridging material (for foot bridges and five heavy bridges) to the Ailette, erection of the foot bridges and bridges over the marshes, at the same time the removal of all obstacles on both banks. Construction of the five heavy bridges. Completion of up and down tracks from the village line up to and beyond the Ailette. All this work must be completed before the assault. Strengthening of the heavy bridges and further improvement of up and down tracks; advance behind the infantry for repair of tracks in the cratered zone, in and beyond the French positions; assistance in the advance of the batteries, the vehicles of the infantry, machine guns, trench mortars, etc. For these purposes, all three resting battalions of the position divisions should be employed; they were to arrive at the bridges about an hour after the beginning of the assault; their first business would be to assist the heavy artillery of the assault divisions up the hill to the top of the Chemin des Dames. Reconnaissance and making of cross-country tracks alongside the main roads; bringing up of bridging material for the passage of the Aisne; assistance to divisions in bridging the Aisne, if ordered. All this work should begin when the infantry assaults .

Notes

Note 1. Bruchmüller, p. 94, says "the whole front of "attack was roughly 38 km. 23.725 miles]",and his map agrees with this. (The War Diary refers to a sketch map, it appears to be missing )

On this day the German long-range guns near Laon (See Sketch B reopened the bombardment of Paris begun on 23rd March (see "1918" Vol. I., p.327). From 2nd to 27th May it had ceased owing to one explosion of a gun, replacement of worn guns (two out of the six available were in action at a time), and changing of position. (The War Diary refers to a Sketch, it appears to be missing )

Note 2. There is a complete technical account of the organization of the artillery attack, with maps, in Bruchmüller, pp. 93-111, and a general account] in Monograph, p. 27. The actual total was 1,036 batteries, the distribution being: Sector Schmettow (on the east), 127; Conta, 198; Winckler, 268; Wichura, 151; and Larisch (added later in the west), 181, the balance being super-heavy batteries under Army control. The batteries in Sector Larisch, however, were directed on Soissons and on localities and passages of the Aisne westward of the front of attack. These batteries, with the batteries of the XV. Corps of the First Army, on the Reims flank, formed the sides of a "box barrage" enclosing the Allied divisions which were attacked. Five superheavy batteries on the Reims flank fired westwards, enfilading thy, valley of the Aisne.

Note 3. The instructions were that lachrymatory gas might be used 300 metres in front of the barrage with a favourable wind, and 600 metres in front with an unfavourable wind. The Germans were prepared to risk a few gas casualties among their own men in consideration of the advantage to be derived from forcing their opponents to keep on their gas masks.

Note 4. See Map , on which the German divisions were marked by the courtesy of the Kriegs-geschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres.(The War Diary refers to a map, it appears to be missing )

Note 5. See The German Preparations for the Attack"

Note 6. The 22nd Division was one of those sent to the assistance of the British Fifth Army in March.

It went into action on the 25th next to the British XIX. Corps, and suffered heavily, especially in the

fighting near Montdidier. It was withdrawn for rest and reorganization during 2nd to 20th April, before being sent to the Chemin des Dames sector. The 21st Division, on its left, had not been in action since the Battle of Malmaison in October 1917; the 61st, next on the left, had not been in action since the retreat of the Germans to the Hindenburg Line in February-March 1917.

Note 7. At 4.30 a.m. General Duchêne had authorized the use north of the Aisne of three battalions (later increased to four) of the 157th Division in reserve), to occupy a switch line Bourg - Braye, behind the Oise - Aisne canal, and to hold the bridgehead covering Œuilly. The German advance was so rapid that only two companies of these four battalions actually crossed the Aisne, and these came at once under such heavy fire that they were dispersed.

Note 8. F.O.A. vi. (ii.), p. 195, gives the following explanation of the failure to destroy the bridges of the Aisne and its canal: “the order arrived too late at General de Maud-Lily's headquarters (11.30 a.m.) [After 12.30 p.m. at Lieut.- General Gordon's]. The Germans were already masters of seven passages and held the others

 under machine-gun fire. On that account, the order to charge the chambers, given verbally between 8 and 8.45 a.m. by General Duchêne to the Chief Engineer of the Army, could not be completely carried out. The engineer parties detailed were caught at the work by the enemy. Nowhere did they receive the order to fire in sufficient time, and all initiative on their part was forbidden by the defence plan. More- over, the first enemy parties arrived mixed up with the last of the retreating French troops. It was in these circumstances that the bridges between Vailly and Maizy fell intact into the hands of the Germans. East of Maizy [where the bridge was specially retained under French control ]the charging had been carried out earlier, on the initiative of the British IX. Corps; but the order to fire did not arrive in time. Nevertheless, the British 8th and 50^th Divisions were able to destroy part of the passages of the Aisne and the canal; the bridge at Pontavert was blown up, thanks to the initiative of a French n.c.o .”

Note 9. Craonne has been rebuilt since the war on lower ground, south of the old site.

Note 10. Lieut. J. L. Gibson D/CCLI., when on the point of capture, struck a German in the face with the dial sight which he was carrying, and was shot down.

Note 11. The battalion was awarded the Croix de Guerre by the French. It had taken many battalions to dislodge it. Monograph (See "The German Preparations for the Attack") says the whole of the 50th Division was held up. The 158th Regiment directly attacked the Bois des Buttes. The 39th Regiment attacked the Butte d'Edmond and was also stopped for some time by the fire from the Bois des Buttes, and was not able to get on till a battalion of the 53rd Regiment was brought in between it and the 158th. The left flank of the position in the Bois des Buttes was then turned.

Note 12. The remaining half of the 2/E. Lancashire was in the Gernicourt Defences.

Note 13. See Footnote p. 3 The casualties of the 15^th Field Company R.E. are not recorded.

Note 14. The Monograph shows that in several instances the bridges were blown up under the very noses of the Germans. See "The German Preparations for the Attack".

Note 15. Some details about the British batteries are available, and are given as typical of what happened to the artillery. The two brigades of the 8th Division were in the Aisne valley, north of the river, below where the Miette flows in.

XXXIII. Brigade R.F.A.

·         32nd Battery: One gun destroyed by bombardment. When enemy infantry approached guns were abandoned and breach blocks and sights removed.

·         33rd Battery: All guns put out of action within a few minutes of the opening of the bombardment.

·         36th Battery: Communication with brigade cut at 2 a.m. At 7.45 a.m., battery position abandoned, dial sights being removed.

·         55th Battery: Only three men escaped. Undamaged guns continued to fire till overrun from the east. An attempt was made to retire the battery, but limbers were driven back by rifle and machine-gun fire.

XLV. Brigade R.F.A.

·         1st Battery: Three or four guns put out of action. Battery fired till 7 a.m.

·         when it was over run. Breach blocks were removed, and men fought with rifles.

·         3rd Battery: Four guns out of the five in action were knocked out. At 7.15 a.m. orders were given to abandon the position.

·         5th Battery: Fired till about 7 a.m., and then engaged the enemy at close quarters with rifles and Lewis guns till overwhelmed. Only one man escaped. The battery was awarded the Croix de Guerre.

57th Battery: All guns knocked out by 2.25 a.m. Position evacuated by survivors at 6.15 a.m.

Note 16. The 15th Field Company R.E.: in charge of the demolition of the bridges over the Aisne and its canal, had its headquarters near Gernicourt.

Note 17. These were the right regiment of the 7th Reserve Division, which had originally attacked the 25th Brigade; they saw the bridge blown up under their very eyes.

Note 18. These were the other two regiments of the 7th Reserve Division.

Note 19. The enemy was the left regiment of the 52nd Division, which had originally attacked the 24th Brigade.

Note 20. The brigade was ordered to retire at 12.20 p.m., when the enemy was within 150 yards. Guns were not destroyed, as it was hoped that the position would be re-established by a counterattack..

A. Battery: Got 4 guns away at 12.40 p.m. but had to abandon them later.

B. Battery: Abandoned position at 1.15 p.m.

C. Battery: Abandoned position at 1. 8 p.m., the battery commander, 1 other officer and a sergeant remaining to the last.

D.(H) Battery: Position abandoned late and personnel caught whilst retiring.

Note 21. The Monograph states that Gernicourt village was not finally taken till 1.30 p.m.

Note 22. Two companies of the 12th 13th Northumberland Fusiliers) three of the 2/Lincolnshire, in the 62nd Brigade; two each of the 7th and 8/Leicestershire in the 110th Brigade; and one each of the 9/K.O.Y.L.I. and 1/East Yorkshire in the 64th Brigade.

Note 23 F.O.A. vi. (ii), p. 102

Note 24. Orders for the movement of the 13th and 1^st Divisions and the staff of the XXI. Corps were given at once: the 4th Division, then moving by the railway to the Third Army, was diverted; and the 170th and 40th Divisions, in the Oise group, were warned to be ready to move.

Note 25. All the fresh divisions which took part in the assault were from the Eighteenth Army except the 7th Reserve, which was taken from the First Army. These all came from the French front.